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Abstract: The publication of Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) Governing the Commons 
fueled significant theoretical and empirical progress in the field of commons 
governance and collective action, most notably in the form of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. A central question within this 
literature is how trust is created, maintained, and potentially destroyed in the 
context of sustainability issues. While the commons literature has provided 
a deeper understanding of trust, most empirical work has been done in 
relatively simple settings that do not capture the complexity of many global, 
institutionally-complex dilemmas that we face today. This paper discusses how 
our understanding of trust in these more complex settings may be improved 
by considering how two broad categories of variables – belief systems and 
networks – influence trust.
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1. Introduction: the importance of trust and the challenge  
of complexity
How can individuals learn to successfully manage common pool resources? 
Since the publication of Governing the Commons, the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework has addressed this issue. Merely posing this 
question was at odds with the prevalent assumption underlying the “tragedy of the 
commons,” elucidated most famously in Hardin’s (1968) paper: resources managed 
as commons are inevitably degraded and the only options to avoid degradation are 
either government control or privatization. In contrast, early empirical work in 
the IAD tradition demonstrated that individual decision makers can, under some 
circumstances, learn to successfully manage common pool resources and avert 
the tragedy assumed by Hardin (Ostrom 1990, 1998; Ostrom et al. 1994). As a 
theoretical framework, IAD has continued to provide us with a more nuanced 
understanding of the types of institutions – conceptualized as combinations of 
various types of rules – that are more likely or less likely to support cooperative 
behavior in the face of CPR dilemmas, conditional on contextual factors such 
as the resource system, the resource units, the governance system, and the users 
(Ostrom 2009).
Trust is a central theoretical variable within this tradition (Ostrom 1998), and 
thus it is no surprise that a great deal of research has focused on how trust amongst 
individuals is created, destroyed, and evolves over time. The most common 
approach to trust derives from Coleman (1990; see also Sztompka 1999). In this 
view trust is manifest as a behavior in which an individual puts herself at risk of 
an outcome dependent upon the actions of others. This is not the only form of trust 
that is relevant to sustainability challenges, but it is the one that has been most 
extensively examined in the literature on decision making. We label this trust in 
actions to differentiate this form of trust from another type of trust considered 
below. It is trust in actions that has been invoked to explain decision making at 
least since Arrow (1974) and to which Poteete et al. (2010:226–227) are referring 
when they discuss the “centrality of trust.”
Trust is an important determinant of sustainability outcomes because it 
influences strategic interaction between actors whose individual incentives are not 
necessarily in alignment with that of the collective (Olson 1965). Trust is crucial 
to collective action since cooperative behavior – acting outside of one’s narrow 
self-interest in order to advance the interests of the group – carries the risk that 
others will not cooperate, leaving cooperators paying all the costs of cooperation 
without receiving commensurate benefits. Thus, in order to make the prediction 
that an actor will behave cooperatively, one must also assume that they have some 
degree of trust that the others involved in their decision-making situation will 
also cooperate. Such situations are frequently analyzed using frames such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Nash 1950; Rasmusen 2001), the tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin 1968), or any of a variety of games where pure self-interest mixed with an 
inability to trust others leads to less than optimum outcomes. Such metaphors are 
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useful but not sufficient for understanding many wrenching conflicts surrounding 
the commons, ranging from local and regional planning efforts (Schneider et 
al. 2003; Feiock and Scholz 2010) to global environmental change (Ostrom 
et al. 2002; Dietz et al. 2003). Before offering the required extensions to our 
understanding of trust, it will be useful to briefly review the state of our current 
understanding. Note that our review remains focused on ideas about trust that 
are close to those used in the commons literature. Especially since trust is often 
viewed as a central feature of social capital, the idea of trust has been deployed in 
many literatures that we do not cover here, including literatures that consider trust 
as a society-wide or culture-wide phenomenon (e.g. Fukuyama 1995; Keele 2007; 
Rothstein and Stolle 2008).
Despite a great deal of theoretical development over the last several decades, 
the empirical settings in which trust has been studied have not fully kept pace 
with the growing complexity of many commons governance issues. In particular, 
IAD scholars have generally studied trust within relatively small and isolated 
institutional settings (Hahn et al. 2006; Ruttan 2006), controlled experimental 
settings (Ostrom et al. 1994; Ostrom and Walker 2003), or some combination of 
the two (Bouma et al. 2008; Vollan 2008). In contrast, many of the actual issues to 
which we wish to generalize our findings are global and institutionally complex, 
involving many hundreds or thousands of actors interacting over substantial 
geographic distances and across many different institutional settings (Sabatier 
1999).
Efforts to understand these more complex commons are emerging (e.g. Young 
2002). In particular, Ostrom’s (2010 a,b) emphasis on polycentric governance 
systems for addressing global environmental change demonstrates the importance 
of the evolving linkages between actors and institutions – especially in situations 
where these actors were previously isolated or embedded in strict hierarchical 
relationships. Such polycentric systems, following the definition of Vincent 
Ostrom et al. (1961:831), are characterized by “many centers of decision making 
which are formally independent of each other.” There are multiple actors, each of 
whom has some autonomy, and who may or may not collaborate. In this essay, 
we argue that a more comprehensive theory of trust is needed to successfully 
apply IAD to these settings. Such a theory must build on research in less complex 
contexts, but must also give attention to the added effects of evolving networks 
and information-sharing amongst those making decisions relevant to sustainability 
and global environmental change.
International engagement with the problem of climate change serves as a useful 
example of such large-scale commons governance problems being addressed by 
a polycentric system (Ostrom 2010 a,b). If we view the system at a high level of 
aggregation to facilitate using it as an example, the actors include nation states, 
non-governmental environmental and development advocacy organizations, 
major corporations and the associations that represent them, scientific assessment 
bodies (and especially the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC) 
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as well as a diversity of formal international organizations. Of course, each of 
these aggregate actors has its own internal policy system composed of individual 
and organizational actors, and so this is clearly a multi-tiered system. Nor are the 
elements neatly nested – a scientist working for a government research unit may 
also be a lead on a chapter in the reports of the IPCC. So the system includes 
actors of very different characters, ranging from the most powerful states on 
the planet to small NGOs, each of which is ultimately comprised of individuals. 
Some actors are embedded neatly within others (e.g., a state or provincial 
government that may choose to take action on greenhouse gas emissions or a 
national research center embedded in a national government), while other actors 
are either autonomous (other nation states) or have complex governance linkages 
often through intermediary organization (e.g., the linkage between nation-states 
and the IPCC Working Groups via the United Nations and the IPCC Secretariat). 
In the discussion that follows, we use international actions on climate change to 
illustrate the issues that are highlighted when we move from more local to more 
global commons governance problems.
The purpose of our discussion is to 1) identify the limits to concepts of trust 
that were developed in the robust literature on local to regional commons, 2) 
to expand on the solid base of the existing literature by distinguishing between 
trust in information and trust in actions, and 3) show the importance of network 
effect on the evolution of trust, especially in larger-scale commons management 
systems. We assert that a more nuanced and complex approach to trust will be 
needed that is faithful to the existing literature while expanding on it. We offer 
some hypotheses in that direction.
1.1. Two limitations in our understanding of trust
The IAD framework has been an important platform for research on trust. As with 
all theoretical frameworks, however, there has been an inherent tension between 
the need to simplify a complex landscape, and to include sufficient detail to ensure 
explanatory power for real-world processes (Sabatier 1999). While IAD has made 
substantial empirical contributions in spite of this tension, we argue that two issues 
deserve attention in generalizing IAD’s findings regarding trust to more complex 
governance settings. Moreover, each of these issues suggest the need to focus on 
new variables that are traditionally under-emphasized in the literature on trust:
Limitation #1: Most research on trust concerns trust in actions, whereas many 
sustainability challenges also involve trust in information.
Trust is a highly context-specific phenomenon, and depends in particular upon the 
object of trust. As noted above, most empirical studies focus on trust in actions, or trust 
objects that are concrete actions taken by another actor – examples include abiding 
by a resource extraction quota or supporting a particular government program. At 
the same time, most issues of sustainability involve large amounts of uncertain 
scientific information, and trust in this information is an important motivator for 
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the policy learning and change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Mitchell 
et al. 2006; Henry 2009). We argue that trust in information is conceptually 
distinct from trust in actions, and understanding this type of trust requires that 
we consider how environmental cognitions (such as beliefs and values) influence 
trust and decision making in sustainability challenges. While Ostrom (2005) has 
addressed the issue of mental models, cognitive structure has not been a central 
feature of the approach and has not been central to the empirical worked inspired 
by the IAD framework. This is an area where other theoretical frameworks – such 
as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 
1999) – provide the theoretical tools necessary to model the role of cognitions 
in the development of trust in information as well as trust in actions that can 
complement the IAD framework.
We note that these two forms of trust are closely related, and it may be that they 
represent developmental stages towards a generalized trust of one another – one 
believes that another actor can be trusted both to provide accurate information and 
to act in a way that is predictable. But as we will emphasize as trust is discussed in 
more detail, the two forms of trust can be distinguished logically and the correlation 
between the two, as well as the temporal sequencing in their development, are 
both questions that require empirical evidence to answer. We will consider the 
relationship between these two forms of trust in more detail below.
Limitation #2: Most of the literature on trust has focused on institutionally 
simple or controlled experimental settings where one can assume that trust can 
be built on personal relationships or behaviors that are directly observed.
Issues of sustainability often involve large numbers of actors who seldom (if ever) 
interact face-to-face, and therefore are often unable to directly observe the actions 
of other actors in the system. This suggests the need to understand how trust is 
generated and maintained outside of repeated direct interactions that characterize 
more local commons, and leads us to a consideration of trust and networks. 
While some scholars have noted the importance of social and policy networks 
for understanding commons governance, and have developed both theory and 
empirical evidence about the effects of network structure (Sandström and Carlsson 
2008; Bodin and Crona 2009; Booher and Innes 2010; Butler and Goldstein 2010; 
Sandström and Rova 2010), the relationship between network evolution and trust 
is in need of greater theoretical development.
Before developing these ideas more fully, we turn to a brief review of the 
current literature on trust, with a particular emphasis on what we have learned 
since Ostrom (1990) about the role of trust in actions in decision making.
1.2. Trust in actions: moving beyond the thin rational actor model
Recent work suggests that trust in actions is influenced by at least four factors, 
three of which are preferences or values that are relatively stable in an individual 
over time, and one of which is a belief that can readily be influenced, at least 
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in principle, by observation of others (Fehr 2009). First, and obviously, an 
individual’s willingness to take trusting actions with uncertain outcome depends 
in part on their overall willingness to take risks. Second, most people also seem 
to have a strong aversion to being betrayed when trust is extended (Fehr 2009 
provides a recent review). Third, when the action taken has the potential for 
benefiting others, as it does in actions to protect a common pool resource, then 
altruism (the degree to which an individual takes account of the well-being of 
others) also matters. Finally, an individual’s assessment of the probability that 
the relevant others will act in a trustworthy fashion rather than betraying the trust 
plays a role in deciding whether or not to engage in an act of trust. This unpacking 
of the factors that underline trusting behavior is helpful in clarifying the dynamics 
of trust, especially in the complex situations that characterize many commons 
governance issues.
Three of these individual characteristics – risk aversion/acceptance, loss/ 
betrayal aversion, and altruism – probably change slowly. Indeed, there is 
some evidence that performance in the trust game frequently used to study trust 
dynamics is influenced by genetically heritable factors (Cesarini et al. 2008). 
While we do not view them as immutable, it does seem likely that these three 
factors are relatively constant for an individual compared to the fourth factor that 
influences trusting behavior – assessments of the likely behavior of others. Thus, 
for example, Fehr (2009) classifies altruism, risk aversion and betrayal aversion 
as preferences while he considers assessments of the trustworthiness of others as 
a belief that can be modified quite readily by evidence. It still may be true that 
individuals differ substantially in their propensity to trust – but in this framework 
that propensity can be thought of as the influence of evidence about the behavior 
of others. In a sense, this propensity is a sort of weight given to a Bayesian prior 
about the probability of betrayal compared to the weight given observed evidence. 
Some people may have strong priors about how trustworthy others are and will 
adjust that view in a particular situation only with substantial evidence, while 
others may give little weight to their priors and rely almost exclusively on context-
specific evidence. So trust may vary because of variance in both priors about 
behaviors, and in the weight given to observations; each of those factors may vary 
across individuals and, within an individual, across interactions and contexts.
While individuals may have different predispositions to trust or not to trust 
others, most theory assumes that trust is quite context-specific. When trust is 
defined as a generalized prediction about the behavior of others, it follows that the 
degree of trust depends on the object of trust. Some individuals or organizations are 
trusted and some are not. Much of the experimental literature on commons and on 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is about how the structure of interactions can influence trust, 
and IAD also notes the importance of knowledge of others – it is, for example, one 
of the key elements in the micro-institutional context described by Poteete et al. 
(2010). So while individuals may have predispositions to be trusting or suspicious 
in the abstract, and many have varying degrees of altruism, risk aversion, and 
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betrayal aversion in experiments and in most commons management contexts, 
this disposition is instantiated in assessments of particular individuals, groups or 
organizations that in turn may be modified based on direct observation of their 
behavior.
2. Trust in information
We now consider a different set of objects in which trust is potentially created 
or destroyed: scientific (factual) information used to inform policy choices. We 
begin with the observation that information is an important motivator for decision 
making within commons governance systems, and trust in information is at least 
as important as trust in actions in supporting successful governance. We also 
argue that trust in information is related to trust in actions but these concepts are 
best decoupled into distinct concepts, which in turn allows for greater flexibility 
in theoretical development and modeling. This brings us to a consideration of how 
belief systems may influence trust in information and, by proxy, may influence 
trust in actions as well. In doing so we draw on the ACF literature (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999), which has developed what amounts to a theory of 
trust in information rather independently from the literature on trust in actions 
that we have just reviewed. Our argument is that both forms of trust are critical 
for commons management, and the dynamics of the two, especially in governing 
large-scale commons such as the global climate, may be sufficiently different to 
warrant careful attention.
2.1. The importance of trust in information
Information is an important commodity in most sustainability debates and 
especially in commons governance. As noted above, the literature on trust 
has focused primarily on actions, one classic example being an actor’s actual 
commitment to agreed-upon quotas for commons harvesting. Less attention has 
been paid to the determinants of trust in the information that informs these actions 
– for example, an actor’s trust in the science that led to the established quota, 
or the perceived need for a quota in the first place. Many sustainability issues 
are mired in conflicts over scientific information that informs the presence (or 
absence) of a problem, the likely causes and severity of problems, and appropriate 
solutions (Lackey 2006). This information must be obtained and processed by an 
actor to formulate strategies for action, and so trust or mistrust in this information 
is also an important driver of conflict and consensus in commons governance 
arenas (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999). In this type of decision-making 
landscape, trust in information can be at least as important as trust in actions.
Since we are dealing with rather abstract concepts, a few definitions are useful 
to support further theoretical development and modeling. In particular, let us focus 
our attention on three objects: 1) a focal actor, named Ego, who is in the position 
of making a determination of trust in a particular piece of information or the 
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actions of another individual; 2) a second actor, named Alter, in whom Ego makes 
a decision to trust or not trust; 3) a particular bit of policy-relevant information, 
communicated by the Alter to Ego, that is meant to inform Ego’s decision or 
otherwise influence Ego’s beliefs. Actors are also referred to as “agents,” and 
may be individual people or aggregated policy actors, such as organizations or 
governments. The simplest example would be to consider individuals who are 
part of a group that makes use of and mutually governs a commons, such as two 
fishers, two harvesters of forest resources, or two nations engaged in addressing 
the problem of climate change.1
Consider an example. As a policy actor, the United Nations (Ego) receives 
information from a variety of sources to inform appropriate responses to climate 
change. One of these sources is the IPCC (Alter), which offers numerous bits of 
information including, for example, the likely impacts of climate change. While 
the United Nations in the aggregate may have some degree of trust towards the 
IPCC, this trust is distinct from the trust that is generated in the bits of information 
flowing from specific reports. Thus, we must consider Ego’s trust in the persuading 
agent separately from Ego’s trust in the information received from Alter, for 
example, the estimates of likely temperature increases, the contribution of various 
nations to these increases, and recommended responses to these threats.
Scale is of tremendous importance in the evolution of trust. At smaller scales, 
such as in the management of a localized resource, both the state of the resource 
and the actions of others may be relatively easy to observe directly. But when one 
moves to a larger scale, and particularly to global commons such as the climate, 
neither the actions of others nor the state of the system are easily observable by 
most actors. Thus, the ability to assess the trustworthiness of others and the ability 
to assess the state of the resource depend much more critically on network ties 
rather than direct information. Some of the debate about climate change pivots 
around whether or not the community of climate scientists that collect and integrate 
the data on climate change and the IPCC (which assimilates and interprets that 
data for the international community) are trustworthy. Most participants in the 
international discussions about policy to limit greenhouse gas emissions are not in 
a position to directly evaluate the data and the assessment, although they may call 
on actors they do trust to advise them. For example, the U.S. Congress recently 
asked the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to assess the science of climate 
change (U.S. National Research Council 2010).
2.2. Relationship between trust in information and trust in actions
Trust in information amounts to trust in the beliefs offered by others. In many 
cases, actors must acquire information not from primary sources (e.g. the scientific 
literature, formal policy analyses, or detailed analyses of the likely actions of 
1
 We note that the actions of nations are shaped by multiple actors within nations, and that nations are 
not the only actors in the global policy system. We simplify for ease of exposition.
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other actors) but from other members of the action arena. With many individuals 
and organizations potentially providing information, and given the risks inherent 
in adopting misinformation, an actor has to assess how much to trust each source. 
While this trust may be correlated with trust about actions, it is distinct from 
it. One may trust how another may act, but feel that actor is not well informed. 
Conversely, one may consider a particular individual’s statement of fact to be 
accurate, even if their actions are not trusted. For example, you may know that 
another fisher violates mutually agreed upon quotas, but still trust the information 
she provides about the actions of others. Or you may feel she adheres strictly to 
the quotas but is either too trusting or too cynical in reporting the behavior of 
others. But generally the two will be related. While the size of the correlation 
between trust in actions and trust in information will vary across contexts and 
even across individuals assessing their trust in others, we suspect the correlation 
will nearly always be positive and often quite strong. In most circumstances it will 
be much easier to observe the information an actor provides than to observe the 
actions they take. This yields a testable proposition:
H1: Trust in information is proportional to trust in Alter’s actions.
We conjecture that in contexts where actions are hard to observe, as they are 
in many policy networks, trust in information may serve as a proxy for trust 
in actions. In localized commons, the link between trust in actions and trust in 
information may be very strong and the distinction we are making here of minor 
consequence. But for polycentric systems engaging many different kinds of actors 
working at different scales, and for regional and especially global commons, we 
believe the distinction becomes much more important and the degree to which 
trust in actions and trust in information are correlated must be assessed with 
context specific empirical examination. For example, it is at the national and 
global scales that arrangements emerge that are specifically intended to provide 
trustworthy information – prominent examples include the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, the IPCC, and the U.S. National Research Council.
2.3. The role of belief systems
A key problem with social learning around sustainability is that individuals are 
subject to a confirmatory bias in the way they interpret information; that is, people 
tend to believe information that supports their prior beliefs and mistrust information 
that disconfirms what they already believe to be true. This phenomenon has been 
labeled “biased assimilation” (Innes 1978; Lord et al. 1979; Munro and Ditto 
1997; Munro et al. 2002), and is an important motivator for considering the role 
that individuals’ belief and value systems play in motivating political behavior 
and conflicts over policy-relevant information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 
1999).
The interaction of biased assimilation with differences in the trust an actor 
ascribes to various other members of a policy system may lead to complex 
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dynamics that in many cases will be antithetical to social learning for sustainability 
and adaptive management. For example, the scientific norm that underpins most 
discussions of adaptive management is that new information should be assessed 
based almost entirely on the quality of the evidence. But in most policy systems, 
the methodological quality of emerging information is hard for most actors to 
assess. As a result, they are likely to evaluate new information based on how 
congruent this information is with prior beliefs, and to form decisions about trust 
accordingly. It is plausible that such dynamics will be chaotic in the sense that 
small difference in the initial distribution of even weakly held beliefs could lead 
to widely divergent outcomes.
The intersection of biased assimilation and differential trust could easily 
lead to substantial differences in beliefs across groups of actors and make those 
differences become hard to resolve even in the face of strong empirical evidence. 
This seems to be the case for U.S. public opinion on climate change, where views 
of conservatives and liberals have become increasingly divergent over time even 
as the scientific consensus has converged (McCright and Dunlap 2011). Recent 
calls for adaptive co-management of ecosystems are in part based on the need 
to build trust in emerging information across multiple types of decision makers 
(Armitage et al. 2007, 2009) and thus can be seen as a response to the need to build 
trust in information in the face of bias and differential trust. Similar approaches 
are being proposed for climate change (U.S. National Research Council 2011).
To summarize these arguments in a testable hypothesis, we argue that trust in 
a particular piece of information is positively related to the degree with which the 
information confirms an actor’s priors:
H2: Trust in information is proportional to the degree to which information is 
congruent with Ego’s prior beliefs.
This proposition is not new to the policy literature. The ACF has long argued that 
biased assimilation causes policy actors to filter evidence through their existing 
beliefs, and in particular those beliefs labeled the “policy core” that relate to 
actors’ understandings of system-wide problems, as well as the causes, severity, 
and likely solutions to perceived problems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). 
These arguments help to explain why supposedly objective analyses are so often 
misused or altogether neglected in the policy process. While these theoretical 
arguments originate from a look at the relationship between Ego and a particular bit 
of information, the logic may be extended to infer that two actors with conflicting 
systems of beliefs will also tend to mistrust one another. This is because they 
are likely to ascribe different meanings to the same piece of information (Leach 
and Sabatier 2005), and therefore come to doubt one another’s good intentions 
in what Sabatier et al. (1987) label the “devil shift” phenomenon. Thus, trust 
in information is not merely a function of the degree to which the information 
confirms Ego’s beliefs, but is also a function of the degree to which Alter’s beliefs 
conform to Ego’s beliefs – if they hold widely divergent viewpoints, then Ego 
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may doubt Alter’s intentions in providing a particular piece of information. If 
you feel most of the members of your community are fairly honest in adhering to 
quotas, you may discount the report of someone who says otherwise and come to 
question their motive for doing so.
H3: Ego’s trust in information is proportional to congruence between the 
beliefs of Ego and Alter.
While these arguments are not new to the policy literature, they have not been 
much emphasized in the boundedly-rational model of the individual upon which 
the IAD framework is built. According to this view, actors are not subject to 
systematic biases in the way they perceive information and, moreover, actors’ 
limited ability to process information implies that they must rely on other sources 
of information to learn how to deal with complex and uncertain problems. The 
most effective way to accomplish this is to populate one’s network with diverse 
perspectives and worldviews (Hong and Page 2004), and thus there is no a priori 
motivation for an actor to mistrust information or actors based on divergent 
viewpoints.
The strength of these differing theoretical perspectives are likely to depend 
greatly upon the context in which commons dilemmas unfold (Dietz and Henry 
2008), and further empirical work is needed in this area. In the meantime, it is 
useful to explicitly state alternatives to the above hypotheses, under the theory 
that actors are not subject to systematic cognitive biases:
H2a: Trust in information is independent of the degree to which information is 
congruent with Ego’s prior beliefs.
H3a: Trust in information is independent of the degree to which Ego’s beliefs 
are congruent with Alter’s beliefs.
These hypotheses of trust in information collectively lead us to a broad consideration 
of how beliefs, values, and other cognitions influence trust. Ultimately, a closer 
examination of cognitive structures are likely to reveal more nuanced insights into 
the types of trust that influence commons governance as well as the determinants 
of trust. And of course there are almost certainly cross-cultural differences in 
these cognitive structures. This is a place where the macro-comparative literature 
on trust might inform work on trust in commons governance, but we will not 
explore those possibilities here. We turn now to a second category of variables 
that have received relatively little attention in the trust literature: the role of social 
and policy networks.
3. Trust and networks
Much of what we know about trust derives from either controlled lab or field 
experiments, or case studies within relatively isolated, small communities 
facing collective action problems. This is perhaps one reason why much of the 
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literature focuses on the importance of face-to-face communication and repeated 
interactions in supporting trust; in small settings where most participants may 
be assumed to know one another and have many opportunities for repeated 
interaction these are natural factors to emphasize. For many commons 
governance issues, however, the population we wish to generalize to is far more 
“messy” in the sense that actors represent a diverse range of interests, drawn 
from many different institutional contexts and geographic regions. Climate 
change is a prototypical example.
The importance of trust in settings such as these has become a major theme 
in the risk literature (Siegrist et al. 2007; Renn 2008:222–230), where it has 
been found that individual perceptions of environmental and technological risk 
are strongly influenced by trust in the institutions and organizations that manage 
risk. For example, in the U.S. one of the strongest predictors of support for, or 
opposition to, nuclear power is the degree of trust in the nuclear industry and the 
government agencies that regulate it (Whitfield et al. 2009). In small to moderate 
scale commons management, direct interaction with others can be commonplace 
and is central to successful commons management. But most citizens have little 
direct interactions with organizations charged with managing societal risk. As a 
result, they must establish their level of trust based on other cues and indirect 
sources of information such as the media where the troubled dynamics of trust in 
information comes into play.
This makes trust in abstract groups something that can be manipulated in 
political and social movement campaigns. A major tactic of those who are opposed 
to putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions or in other ways reducing them 
is to raise questions about the trustworthiness of climate science. McCright and 
Dunlap have labeled this strategy “anti-reflexivity” (2010). It is not new. The 
same strategy, sometimes deployed by the same organizations and individuals, 
was used to resist regulation of DDT, smoking, the air emissions that cause acid 
rain, and ozone depleting substances (Oreskes and Conway 2011).
3.1. The importance of networks
There is an influential group of actors where trust about actions falls somewhere 
between the very abstract and generalized views of the public about institutions 
and large organizations, and the experience-based and particularistic views of 
those actively managing commons – whether in the real world or in an experiment. 
These are the professionals and activists whose work constitutes policy networks. 
Members of policy networks certainly have some opportunity to directly observe 
and learn from the behaviors of others. But many policy networks are sufficiently 
large and complex that actors will have no direct experience with most other 
actors. Further, many important policy decisions are made, if not in secret, at 
least in processes that are not transparent to those not present during the decision-
making process. Anyone who has served on a committee or other decision-
making body will know that the minutes of a meeting, even if accurate, seldom 
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capture the nuance of the process that led to a decision. And some actions, such as 
conversations between lobbyists and legislators, are usually done behind closed 
doors.
Thus, it would seem that the study of trust in policy networks would follow 
one of Ostrom’s suggestions regarding directions for future research:
“We need to develop an underlying theory of human behavior in diverse 
settings so that we can begin to predict how individuals who interact in one 
type of setting will or will not gain trust and reciprocity compared to another 
type of setting…” (Ostrom 2010 a:19).
We submit that national and global policy networks are one such setting, and one 
of great importance as they are the arena in which rules for commons governance 
are often developed. The networks literature provides some insight into how 
trust may be modeled in more complex action arenas such as policy networks. 
Within a policy network, trust is potentially built not only as a result of dyadic, 
interpersonal interactions, but also through the use of heuristics that actors may 
use to attribute trustworthiness to others based on their network position or 
shared attributes. Discussion of these heuristic factors emerge primarily from the 
literature on social and policy networks, but are also compatible with mainstream 
theoretical perspectives on trust. From these literatures we can develop hypotheses 
regarding the role of three key network effects on trust: reputation, transitivity, and 
homophily. We posit that these factors will have a direct and substantial influence 
on an actor’s assessment of the probability that particular others will act in a 
trustworthy way. They may also, in the longer term, influence an actor’s degree of 
altruism, preferences with regard to risk and betrayal aversion, and priors about 
the trustworthiness of strangers. But whether or not this is true, it is very likely 
that networks will be important in shaping beliefs about the trustworthiness of 
specific other actors in the network.
Much of what we know about the relationship between network structures 
and trust is tied to the literature on social capital, which emphasizes the mutually-
reinforcing “virtuous triad” of trust, social networks, and norms of reciprocity 
(Coleman 1990; Putnam 2000). While this literature began with a more qualitative 
treatment of the relationship between networks and trust, more recent research 
has begun to specify more concrete ways in which social capital is reflected in 
the structure of actual policy or social networks (Lin 1999; Burt 2000; Henry 
et al. 2011a). As we move from the policy network of those actively engaged 
in shaping decisions about policy and regulation to the polity as a whole, we 
move from trust of the sort we are considering, ultimately grounded in dyadic 
relationships, to social capital. At that larger scale, for many people trust is not 
based on direct observation, or even indirect observation via traceable network 
ties. Trust is rather assigned to institutions, organizations, roles and public figures, 
and might be thought of as the average value across a very large and only loosely 
connected network.
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3.2. Conceptualizing trust as a network
In thinking about the processes that generate trust within a network, it is useful 
to introduce the concept of a trust network, or a network where individual policy 
actors are possibly linked via the existence of dyadic trust relations (Josang 
et al. 2006). Such a network might represent trusting relations about actions or 
information, and somewhat different structures will be obtained for different 
forms of trust within a given community. For purposes of explication we will 
consider only one type of trust, but the approach we outline can be generalized to 
consider trust in actions and trust in information simultaneously. While the kinds 
of networks structures and properties that are likely to be important for trust are 
well known in the network research community, they may be less familiar to the 
commons research community, so we provide a simple illustration.
Figure 1 displays a hypothetical trust network with three agents labeled A, B 
and C (these agents may be interchangeably referred to as “vertices” or “nodes”). 
Trust is represented as the linkages between two agents in a dyad. In the simplest 
conception of trust (e.g. ignoring different types and intensities of trust, and 
ignoring the possible differences between a lack of trust and outright mistrust), 
we may think of each pair of individuals as having two possible direct links. A 
may or may not trust B, and B may or may not trust A. This is called a “directed 
dyad” in which each link from an actor to each other actor takes on one of two 
values: either trust (a link exists) or non-trust (a link does not exist). So in Figure 
1 we have that agents A and B trust each other, C trusts B but not A, and neither 
A nor B trust C.
In thinking of trust as a network of interactions amongst policy participants, 
it is crucial to recognize that trust networks, like many other types of socially- or 
politically-relevant relationships, evolve over time – new actors may enter or exit 
the system, and trust linkages may be dynamically created or destroyed. In other 
words, trust networks are evolving, stochastic objects. Given this, one useful way 
to approach the network mechanisms that influence trust is to think in terms of the 
Schematic depicts a sample trust network 
with three agents. Agents A and B trust 
each other; C trusts B but not A; neither A 
nor B trust C.
A
B
C
Figure 1: Trust as a network.
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conditional formation of linkages. Individual agents make decisions to form or not 
form a trust linkage with a specific actor, taking the rest of the network structure 
as given for a point in time. In this paper we illustrate the possible network effects 
by focusing on Ego’s decision to trust Alter (the potential trust linkage is drawn 
as a dashed line), given the larger network topology, which is fixed from the 
perspective of Ego and represented by black links. In a fishery, this might be 
Ego’s decision to take seriously Alter’s reports about the behavior of others or to 
accept that Alter is following the quota system rules. In a climate policy network 
it might be Ego’s decision to accept estimates of the economic impacts of a policy 
developed by Alter, or it might be a decision to believe Alter when they say they 
will publicly support a compromise measure.
3.3. The role of homophily
One of the major factors that are thought to influence the structure of networks 
is homophily, or the tendency of network actors to form ties with others who are 
similar to themselves (McPherson et al. 2001). Homophily may be based on any 
set of actor attributes, and is often considered to be an important explanation 
for the types of segregated network structures that are often observed in social 
and policy networks (Girvan and Newman 2002; Henry 2007, 2011; Henry et al. 
2011b).
The commons literature has long recognized the importance of heterogeneity 
in shaping collective action (Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Poteete et al. 2010: 
54–57). It has been noted that differences in interests and values, power, control 
of resources, and concern with protecting the common resource, and that these 
differences often align with dimensions of social stratification such as gender, 
class and ethnicity. Ostrom (2005) notes the importance of alignments of like 
actors, as does the literature on size or group and commons governance (Yang 
et al. 2011). Carlsson and Sandström (2008) do note the importance of the 
tradeoff between diversity and heterogeneity in successful commons governance. 
However, the idea of homophily deserves more extensive exploration. Trust 
networks provide one mechanism for integrating homophily into our thinking 
about commons.
Homophily may be explained in the context of trust networks by the tendency 
of individuals to believe that similarity in terms of certain easily observed 
attributes, such as educational background, policy preferences, or institutional 
affiliation signals similarity in terms of other difficult-to-observe attributes that 
are critical for the formation of a trust relationship. For example, if an individual 
is both altruistic (i.e. predisposed to cooperation) and also an environmentalist, 
then he or she may believe that other environmentalists are also predisposed to 
cooperation and therefore trustworthy. This may be at least a partial explanation for 
why political activists tend to trust like-minded activists, and mistrust institutions 
or individuals with values that they believe to be contrary to their own. Thus 
similarity on a variety of attributes may lead to an assessment that an individual 
Information, networks, and the complexity of trust in commons governance 203
can be trusted in the actions they will take, in, for example, forming political 
coalitions or making compromises.
Homophily may take on two forms with regard to its effect on trust about 
beliefs: actors may be more likely to trust information produced by those who are 
similar to themselves, or actors may be less likely to trust information produced 
by those who are dissimilar to themselves. These aversion and attraction aspects 
of homophily may work independently or in tandem. It is useful to note, however, 
that despite the attention paid to homophily as an attraction mechanism (see 
McPherson et al. 2001 for a review), it can be shown that one need not assume 
that actors have a strong preference for trusting, or working with, others who 
share their underlying attributes in order to produce clustering within a network. 
This is illustrated perhaps most convincingly in Thomas Schelling’s classic 
model of segregation within societies (Schelling 1969, 1971; see also Henry 
et al. 2011b for an application to evolving networks), where slight preferences 
for homophily lead to substantial segregation. We might conjecture that the 
current polarization in U.S. discussions about climate change is a result of such 
segregation mechanisms.
We summarize these arguments in the following general proposition:
H4: Ego’s trust in Alter is proportional to the similarity between Ego and 
Alter.
It is important to note that this hypothesis is meant to make explicit the general 
phenomenon of homophily, however future empirical work will need to further 
disaggregate this hypothesis to account for the roles of specific types of attributes 
in driving trust (or mistrust). For example, if one focuses on belief-system 
homophily, then H4 is a subtle restatement of H3. But other attributes are also 
likely to matter. For example, we can extrapolate from the IAD framework that 
shared organizational or institutional affiliations might be an important driver of 
homophily, since such similarities are likely the basis for common interests in 
a policy network, just as common position in the social structure can produce 
common interests in the larger world. But as noted above, other theoretical 
traditions (such as the ACF) emphasize the importance of shared belief- or value-
systems in the formation of trust relationships. In the case of U.S. climate policy 
debates, it may be that party or ideological identification has become the basis 
of strong homophily, or it could be that such homophily is structured based on 
the dependence of constituents on fossil fuels industries. While affiliation and 
interests are often correlated with beliefs and values, the degree of correlation 
will vary across contexts and may not always be very high. As yet, empirical 
evidence is not adequate to allow us to assess the importance of each factor 
(organizational affiliation versus beliefs and values) in national or global policy 
networks. For example Laumann and Knoke (1987), in a study of U.S. national 
policy systems, assume that organizational affiliation alone shapes networks, while 
Dietz and Rycroft (1987) working in one of the same policy systems at the same 
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time conclude that institutional affiliation, values and beliefs, and professional 
socialization all have influences on network structure.
3.4. The role of transitivity and reputation effects
Reciprocity and transitivity are additional network effects on trust that 
potentially operate at the level of three or more actors. Reciprocity effects 
capture the idea that, if one network actor trusts another, then this trust is likely 
to be returned (or “reciprocated”) later by another actor in the network. This is 
most commonly thought of in terms of specific reciprocity, where a repeated 
history of cooperation between pairs of agents builds a mutual reputation for 
being trustworthy, which in turn supports future cooperative behavior (Ostrom 
et al. 1994; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Rasmusen 2001). On the other hand, this 
effect may also be thought of in terms of generalized reciprocity, where this 
reputation is spread through multiple trusted partners before it is ultimately 
returned to a given network actor.
Figure 2 illustrates how these effects may relate to the structure and evolution 
of networks, in terms of Ego’s choice to form a “trust linkage” with Alter, given 
the conditional structure of the overall trust network (as noted above, we will 
speak simply of trust or a lack of trust for ease of explication, but network models 
can incorporate degrees of trust rather than a simple dichotomy). Should Ego 
choose to trust Alter (dashed links) in any of the cases depicted in Figure 1, 
then a cycle will be created within the network. These cycles may be short (in 
the simplest case, they may be a reciprocated trust configuration between Ego 
and Alter represented by a two-cycle) or long (including any k actors within the 
network to form a k-cycle). In these cycles, Alter’s trustworthy reputation spreads 
to actor A1, then to actor A2, and so on until an actor further down the cycle (Ego 
in this case) is able to make a judgment about Alter based on the reputation that 
has propagated throughout the network. Longer cycles are likely to yield smaller 
reputation effects, so Ego’s propensity to trust Alter on the basis of reciprocity 
is most likely a decreasing function of cycle length. If the density of cycles is 
high enough, an individual embedded in the network may have a relatively high 
level of trust for all others in the network, or at least in their region of it. These 
arguments may be summarized as follows:
H5: Due to reputation effects, Ego is more likely to trust Alter if that decision 
creates a cycle in a trust network.
H6: The probability that Ego will trust Alter due to reputation effects is 
inversely proportional to the length of the cycle within the trust network that 
would be created by that decision.
Transitivity is another important network effect that may work to build trust among 
groups of actors. Through transitivity, Ego is likely to adopt the trust judgments 
made by her trusted partners. This phenomenon is commonly known as “the 
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friend of my friend is my friend,” and in this case implies that, if a particular actor 
is trustworthy, then whomever they trust must also be trustworthy.
Figure 3 depicts several ways in which transitivity may be reflected in the 
structure of an evolving network. In the schematics, Ego’s choice to trust Alter 
is supported by at least one indirect path from Ego to Alter – by following these 
indirect paths beginning at Ego, we begin to discover the other agents whom Ego 
is also likely to trust by proxy. The simplest instantiation of transitivity is depicted 
in the left panel of Figure 3; in this case, Ego may choose to close the indirect 
path mediated by actor A1 by forming a direct trust relationship with Alter. Other, 
more complex network configurations may also serve to strengthen this effect. 
For example, if Ego shares not just one but multiple indirect paths of trust to Alter 
(as depicted in the middle panel of Figure 3) then Ego has further social evidence 
that Alter is trustworthy. In this case, the formation of a trust linkage between 
Ego and Alter would create what is known as a directed k-triangle (Snijders et al. 
2006). It is likely that Ego’s propensity to trust Alter is an increasing function of k, 
or proportional to the number of indirect paths of trust between Ego and Alter:
Two-cycle Three-cycle Four-cycle k-cycle
Cyclic configurations represent specific or generalized reciprocity in a network amongst an 
arbitrary number of agents.
Ego
Alter
A2
A1 Ego
Alter
Ak
A1
A2
Ego
Alter
A1
Ego Alter
Figure 2: Cyclic configurations of trust.
Transitive triad k-triangle Transitive k-path
Transitive configurations represent trust linkages that are supported by one or more indirect trust 
relations.
AlterEgo
A1
A1
A1
Alter
A1
A2
Ak
EgoAlter
A1
Ego
Figure 3: Transitive configurations of trust.
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H7: Due to transitivity effects, Ego is more likely to trust Alter if Ego trusts at 
least one other actor who also trusts Alter.
H8: The probability that Ego will trust Alter due to transitivity effects is 
proportional to the number of actors that trust Alter and are trusted by Ego.
Social evidence that Alter is trustworthy may also come from the existence of 
a longer path of trust between Ego and Alter, as depicted in the right panel of 
Figure 3. Through the same logic, transitive effects may lead in this case to 
Ego’s decision to trust Alter, however these effects (as with reputation effects) 
are likely to be a decreasing function of Ego’s “distance” from Alter within the 
network.
4. Conclusion
In recent work, Ostrom has emphasized the value of polycentric arrangements for 
governing commons, and especially global commons. The theme of polycentric 
governance runs back to her earliest work (see Chapter 4 in Governing the 
Commons, based on her 1965 dissertation) as well as early work by Vincent 
Ostrom (1953 a,b). Polycentric governance is a logical extension of the path 
opened by Governing the Commons. However, polycentric governance will often 
engage actors whose relationships to one another will be somewhat different than 
those found in the typical commons management situation. These differences are 
matters of degree, and certainly have precedent in the literature on more localized 
commons. But as polycentric governance systems emerge to address global and 
regional environmental change, and as we begin to address more directly the 
effects of global teleconnections on even local resource management, we will 
have to continue down paths that were initiated in Ostrom’s opus but not fully 
explored there.
Here we have focused on two characteristic features of polycentric governance 
systems – the importance of information and the existence of complex patterns 
of network connections among actors – and examined their implications for trust. 
Trust has long been acknowledged as central to commons governance and risk 
management. But that literature emphasizes trust about actions, while in many 
policy systems trust in the information that can be obtained from other actors 
is also vitally important, and perhaps more so in large polycentric systems than 
in more local commons governance situations. As governance systems embrace 
adaptive risk management as a way to deal with uncertainty around problems like 
climate change (U.S. National Research Council 2010), trust becomes even more 
important.
If we return to the climate change example, much attention has been 
given to trust in actions within this system, and indeed many would argue 
that concerns with free-rider problems is the reason that international 
action on climate change is largely stalled. This, in turn, is related to trust 
in information – will it be possible to develop accurate assessments of how 
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others are acting when many critical actions depend on information that must 
be obtained indirectly? For example, most mechanisms for giving credits for 
carbon sequestration rely on some mixture of national reporting and third 
party verification. In both cases, assessing trust will come, in great part, from 
indirect connections, such as between a nation and third party certifiers or 
international scientific assessment bodies rather than from direct observations 
of one nation by another.
The need to learn how to adaptively manage climate change risks as we 
proceed is widely acknowledged (U.S. National Research Council 2011), and 
here again both forms of trust matter. If we think of nations as a key set of actors 
in the social learning process, and viewing policies as social experiments, each 
nation must trust that others will implement actions mutually agreed upon. When 
the actions are those of reducing emissions, this is just the critical free-rider 
problem. But in the case of social learning, some actions may involve adhering 
to agreements about how to implement actions. This may include, for example, 
the ways in which carbon prices might be implemented, or the ways in which 
leakage of emissions across borders via carbon embedded in trade goods are 
handled. And of course the need for trust in information provided is paramount. 
Deceptive or even just inaccurate information could actively degrade the global 
capacity for social learning.
We emphasize the way in which network structures influence the evolution 
of trust by focusing on three factors (transitivity, reputation and homophily) that 
have been considered in many past studies of social and policy networks. These 
concepts can potentially enrich our understanding of the candidate drivers of 
trust, especially in extra-local or global research settings. In particular, the 
hypotheses that we propose illustrate how local dynamics of network formation 
may unfold within larger, more complex networks of trust, and are testable using 
emerging methodologies for the modeling of observed network structures, such 
as exponential random graph models (ERGM; see for example Snijders et al. 
2006). Future research in this area needs to carefully consider the theoretical 
significance of network parameters such as k-triangles or k-cycles, and we 
have offered one set of possible interpretations in the context of evolving trust 
networks.
Networks can facilitate information sharing and will be critical for the social 
learning needed to move towards sustainability (Henry 2009). But network 
processes such as homophily and transitivity can also move actors away from a 
widely shared understanding of a problem and towards segmented and polarized 
understandings that retard effective commons management. We acknowledge 
that we have done little more here than indicate one direction further inquiry 
might take in exploring these areas. However, we believe progress can be 
rapid because the foundation laid by Governing the Commons and the work 
it has inspired is sufficiently solid to readily support such extensions and 
elaborations.
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